Geneva and its aftermath for Sri Lanka and India

By Neville Ladduwahetty

The US backed resolution on "Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka" was passed in Geneva with Indian support as a result of Tamil Nadu compulsions. To save face for this reversal from its original principled stand not to support the resolution, India threw a lifeline to Sri Lanka by modifying the last paragraph in the resolution to include "in consultation with and with the concurrence of the government of Sri Lanka". This demonstrated with stark clarity the following: (1) Influence of Tamil Nadu on Sri Lanka/India relations. (2) Power and influence of state governments to compel Delhi to reverse principled positions and support positions that reflect interests of State governments. (3) Leadership failure on the part of Delhi to convince Tamil Nadu that what was at stake were India’s national and international interests as a regional and emerging global power. (4) The need for Sri Lanka to pay equal or more attention to developments in Tamil Nadu rather than Delhi.

The resolution encourages the Office of the UNHRC to actively engage in the implementation of the constructive recommendations in the LLRC report and to take additional steps to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation. While the emphasis of the LLRC recommendations is more on reconciliation and less on accountability the Office of the UNHRC would attempt to focus more on accountability. Furthermore, the Government is not bound to accept all the recommendations in the report. The responsibility for deciding which recommendations are to be implemented rests with Parliament. Under the circumstances, if there is a lack of concurrence as to what recommendations to implement and also the strategies and resources needed to implement them, it could strain relationships. Under the circumstances, only time will tell whether India’s intervention was a lifeline or whether it would turn out to be a noose.

REASONS for SUPPORTING the

RESOLUTION

In an attempt to explain the reasons for supporting the resolution India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated during a joint secession of Parliament that the US resolution "covers our objective namely, the achievement of a future for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka based on equity, justice and self-respect"(The Island, March 20, 2012). Instead of justifying Delhi’s actions in such generalities, it would be very helpful to Sri Lanka if the PM elaborated in specific terms how the Tamil community, and only the Tamil community, to the exclusion of the other communities were denied equity, justice and self-respect. If the primary reason for this perception is the absence of a political solution, the PM should be fully aware that the reason why successive governments have failed to forge a political solution acceptable to all communities is because the 13th Amendment that India imposed when it last intervened is inimical to the interests of the majority Sinhala community. Implementation of the 13th Amendment in face of this opposition would be at the cost of political instability for any government; the very same reason that prompted India to reverse its original stand on the US-sponsored resolution.

Being forced to accept a political framework that is inimical to Sri Lanka’s innate interests is the reason for the lack of enthusiasm to implement the 13th Amendment. India’s repeated reference to it is not perceived as being genuinely helpful. If India is truly interested in the welfare of the Tamil community in particular, for reasons internal to India and the welfare of the other communities in Sri Lanka for regional reasons, India should unshackle Sri Lanka from the political bonds it imposed when India last intervened, and give Sri Lanka the space and freedom to evolve its own autochthonous political framework similar to what Sri Lanka requested in Geneva regarding reconciliation. This is a debt India owes Sri Lanka for having backtracked from its original principled stand on the resolution.

PROTECTING SRI LANKA’S INTERESTS

The previous intervention by India on behalf of the Tamil community resulted in Sri Lanka being forced to accept the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment. This sealed how Sri Lanka was to be governed in complete violation of a Peoples’ right of self determination to choose how they are governed. As in the past, in the future too, the influence of Tamil Nadu would determine outcomes relating to fishing, oil exploration and the future of Kachchativu. Judging from the suggestion of the former President of India, Abdul Kalam for Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu to each fish 3days in the week and allow the fish to take a breather on the 7th day, is a pointer to the level of "equity and justice" Sri Lanka could expect from the fact that Tamil Nadu’s fishing fleet is several fold more than that of Sri Lanka’s. At this point in time India is only "seeking" oil exploration blocks from Sri Lanka. The lifeline marketed by India in Geneva would be the reminder to demand favourable responses and how persuasive India could be in this regard would be influenced by the political clout Tamil Nadu could exert on the central government in Delhi. Demands also have been made to claim Kachchativu. However spurious the claim, pressures to cede to this demand would result in an alteration of the International Maritime Boundary in favour of India.

These developments must be seen in the background of Mr. Karunanadhi’s statement that his dream is Tamil Eelam. Although this statement reflects the sentiments of the DMK for the moment, it is bound to be picked up by Mrs. Jayalalitha’s AIADMK because of the rivalry between the two. In their attempt to outdo each other politically the influence each has with the center would be exploited at the expense of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka cannot hope to depend on Delhi to act with principle as evidenced in Geneva. Therefore, Sri Lanka has to develop strategies to protect its sovereign interests starting with establishing an identifiable International Maritime Boundary that could be monitored. Such an undertaking should be seen as an investment to protect healthy relations with India. Not to do so would be to allow relations with India to deteriorate to contentious levels through the manipulation of rival political parties within Tamil Nadu.

US – INDIA NEXSUS

The outcome in Geneva was perhaps forged when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Jayalalitha, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The motivation for the US Secretary of State to visit the Chief Minister of one of India’s 28 states has to be compelling. This relationship is driven by the respective interest groups; Tamil diaspora in the case of the US and the Sri Lankan Tamils in the case of Tamil Nadu. The power and influence of these internal alliances and international relationships vary depending on the developments within each country. Whatever these variables, Sri Lanka has to figure out and develop strategies to overcome the effects of "dreams" such as those of Karunanaidhi and the Tamil diaspora for Tamil Eelam, with dividends for the US not only to gain a foothold but also to curb China’s influence in the emerging strategic relevance of the Indian Ocean. Since the dream of Tamil Eelam could encourage Tamil Nadu to also unhinge itself from the Indian Union, both India and Sri Lanka should prepare strategies to protect each other separately and jointly from possible threats to the integrities of their respective territories.

Perhaps, the political hierarchy and the intelligentsia of India are confident that despite these developments India has the needed capabilities to prevent the dismemberment of India. If this confidence is misguided, the 13th Amendment would be the first step in a long chain of events to destabilize both Sri Lanka and India. It is therefore in the interest of Sri Lanka to bring to the attention of India that what is at play are mutually self-fulfilling efforts by internal and external forces to destabilize Sri Lanka and through it India, in the pursuit of dreams and geostrategic interests. The soft power of diplomacy should be exploited to the fullest to explain to India that Sri Lanka needs to protect its interests even if India remains unconcerned, and engage with India to inform them the measures Sri Lanka plans to adopt to protect its sovereign interests.

CONCLUSION

The Geneva resolution calls for the implementation of the recommendations in the LLRC report. The Government on the other hand intends to be selective and implement only those recommendations sanctioned by Parliament. Any lack of congruency would make the relationship between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government contentious. In such an eventuality, the professed lifeline maneuvered on behalf of Sri Lanka by India would in fact turn out to be a noose. Notwithstanding this possibility, one fact is starkly evident; that India left Geneva with its image bruised as far as the Asian countries that opposed the resolution were concerned. Despite this image, India would claim that it did Sri Lanka a favour and attempt to use this spin to claim drilling rights in the Cauvery Basin.

The last minute reversal by India from the principled position it initially took was due to compulsions from Tamil Nadu. This demonstrated with stark reality, the power of state governments to force the Central government in Delhi to act against its larger regional and global interests. This power would continue to be exploited by Tamil Nadu to make demands for the rights of Kachchativu and to fish in Sri Lankan waters. This display of failed leadership to convince Tamil Nadu will cause Sri Lanka to act with cautious apprehension in its dealings with India. One way for Delhi to regain its image after the betrayal in Geneva, would be to relieve Sri Lanka of its obligations under the 13th Amendment, and free Sri Lanka to evolve a political solution that would not turn out to be a threat to its territorial integrity with reverberations in India. Such a step should be undertaken with the clear realization that to do so would not only secure Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity but that of India as well. The emphasis by India to implement the 13th Amendment carries with it inherent threats to the integrity of both countries, with opportunities for external influences such as the US and the Tamil diaspora to manifest themselves in the affairs of both countries as they did in Geneva.

The External Affairs Minister of India Mr. Krishna stated as recently as January 2012: " India’s security depends on Sri Lanka – there are large security issues that affect both countries in the Indian Ocean". If Sri Lanka is to be territorially secure, devolution should not be to Provinces but to Districts. India for the sake of its own security, should take the initiative to bring about this change and make both countries territorially secure.