by Selvam Canagaratna
"Yesterday upon the stair / I met a man who wasn’t there / He wasn’t there again today / Oh, how I wish he’d go away."
- Hughes Mearns, Antigonish (1899)
For over a half-century now US policy toward Iran has been drowning in irony.
Needless to say, the latest ironic twist comes from the Obama Administration’s decision to impose even more stringent sanctions to choke off Iran’s main economic artery, its oil export industry, ostensibly to ensure that one of the larger nations in the Middle East does not acquire an offensive nuclear capability.
The truth, as Gary Leupp, Professor of History at Tufts University notes, is very different. America is, and has been for over three decades, hell bent on regime change in Iran, and this is why: "The real reason Washington wants regime change is that, in the most mass-based, genuine revolutionary upheaval in the modern history of the Muslim world, the Iranian people overthrew the brutal US-imposed regime of the Shah in 1979, depriving it of the services of the ‘Gendarme of the Gulf’ serving American oil interests, and intervening in Yemen (to support royalists against republicans) and Oman (to suppress a secessionist movement). It was a huge blow to Washington’s geopolitical interests, and the US wants to re-establish its lost hegemony."
The origins of that 1979 revolution go back to the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s only democratic Prime Minister, Mohamed Mossadeq in ‘Operation Boot’, a coup orchestrated jointly by the CIA and British intelligence, which saw the Shah of Iran brought back from exile.
Robert Fisk, the famed Middle East correspondent of the Independent, London, in his magisterial work The Great War for Civilization: the Conquest of the Middle East, wrote that the return of the exile ". . . set in motion a quarter-century in which the Shah of Shahs, ‘Light of the Aryans’, would obediently rule Iran – repressively, savagely, corruptly and in imperious isolation – on our behalf. . .
"The fall of the Shah was an epic. His downfall had about it something of a medieval morality play, even ancient tragedy. It might have qualified as Greek if the Shah had been a truly great man who fell from grace through a single flaw. But he was not a great man and his sins were many. Hubris was perhaps his greatest crime, although the Iranians saw things somewhat differently. Yet they sensed this mythic element in their revolution even before the King of Kings piloted his personal Boeing airliner out of Mehrabad airport for the last time on 16 January 1979." [And, once more, flew into luxurious exile!]
In his book, Fisk recalls talking in 1997 to C. M. Woodhouse, then aged 79, Britain’s retired senior secret agent in ‘Operation Boot’ who in the last years of his life had been a guerrilla fighter in Greece, a Tory MP and a much honoured Greek linguist and academic. Almost everyone who had destroyed Iranian democracy was by then dead: Kermit Roosevelt, the senior CIA man in Teheran, his boss Allen Dulles, Robin Zaehner of the British Foreign Office, the two mysterious Rashidian brothers who organized the coup, Mossadeq himself and the last Shah of Iran. Woodhouse, he noted, was the last survivor, and to him Fisk directed the crucial question: "why Britain and the United States, the ‘West’ – why we – had chosen to destroy Iran’s only secular democracy?"
Woodhouse looked at Fisk with his penetrating, unwavering eyes. "I’ve sometimes been told that I was responsible for opening the doors for the Ayotollah – for Khomeini and the others," he replied. "But it’s quite remarkable that a quarter of a century elapsed between ‘Operation Boot’ and the fall of the Shah. In the end it was Khomeini who came out on top – but not until years later. I suppose that better use could have been made of the time that elapsed."
"I was astonished," confesses Fisk. "The coup against Mossadeq, the return of the Shah, was, in Woodhouse’s mind, a holding operation, a postponement of history. There was also the little matter of the AIOC, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company – later British Petroleum – which Mossadeq had just nationalized. The return of the young Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi was the ultimate goal. It cost a couple of million pounds, a planeload of weapons and perhaps five thousand lives. And twenty-five years later, it all turned to dust."
Fisk observed that the Americans had chosen to call their part of the coup plot ‘Operation Ajax’, "which must at least have appealed to the scholar in Woodhouse, even if its classical origins did not invoke success; Ajax was second only to Achilles in bravery, but he killed himself in a fit of madness, a fate the Americans would have liked visited upon Mossadeq. But then Operation Boot/Ajax – though it was undeniably about oil – was never intended to change the map of the Middle East, let alone bring ‘democracy’ to Iran. ‘Democracy’, in the shape of the popular and somewhat effete Mossadeq, was the one thing Washington and London were not interested in cultivating. This was to be regime change on the cheap."
It was in 1997, Fisk reveals in a footnote, that the CIA unsurprisingly announced that "almost all the documents on the Mossadeq coup had been destroyed in the early 1960s." The announcement was characterised as a ‘terrible breach of faith with the American people’ by the former CIA Director James Woolsey who, in 1993, had publicly promised that the Iran records would be made public. A CIA historian had noted that there had been ‘a culture of destruction’ at the Agency in the early Sixties, said Fisk.
"Mossadeq’s rule and the coup that ended Iran’s independence in 1953 would provide a bitter lesson to the revolutionaries of 1979," wrote Fisk. "If the Shah was ever to be dethroned, there could be no flirtation with constitutional rights, no half-measures, no counter-revolutionaries left to restore Western power in Iran. There were also lessons for the Americans and British, and for the Shah, had they chosen to pay attention. The Shah would henceforth always be seen as a tool of the United States and Britain."
After Mossadeq had been booted out, Allen Dulles praised Woodhouse for visiting Washington and persuading the Eisenhower Administration to back the coup: "That was a nice little egg you laid when you were here last time!" he told the man from MI6.
"But we don’t go in for ‘little eggs’ any more," noted Fisk. "More ambitious ideological projects, vast armies – and bigger egos – are involved in ‘regime change’ today. Maybe that’s why they can fail so quickly and so bloodily. The coup against Mossadeq was the first such operation carried out by the Americans in the Cold War – and the last by the British. But the final word must go to the CIA’s man, Kermit Roosevelt [grandson of the buccaneering ex-President Theodore]: ‘If we are ever going to try something like this again,’ he wrote with great prescience, ‘we must be absolutely sure that [the] people and army want what we want’."
Obama and Cameron are one of a kind; like their respective predecessors in office, they play dumb about Israel’s sizable nuclear arsenal dating back three decades, but are nevertheless determined to go to war, if necessary, for the Big Lie: keep the Middle East a nuclear-free zone!
What, then, are they now after? Fisk has already told us: no more ‘little eggs’ [those are for the birds.]
Regime-change is the name of the game.